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To what end is New Delhi putting its new-found power and influence? Is India band-
wagoning with a rising China, or balancing against it? In contrast to conditions under 
unipolarity, when bandwagoning implied coalition with the United States [Wohlforth 
1999: 25], today, countries must navigate a complex order in which multiple centres 
of power have emerged, with China foremost among them [Stephen 2014; Vezirgianni-
dou 2013; Rapkin, Thompson 2003]. In this article, bandwagoning is defined as aligning 
with the major rising power in a power transition (in this case, China), and balancing as 
aligning with the currently dominant, but declining power (in this case, the United States) 
[Schweller 1994: 81]. Based on an analysis of New Delhi’s multilateral and geo-strategic 
diplomacy, it can be observed that India’s approach varies according to issue area and 
institutional context. First, as a rising power, India encounters multilateral institutions 
with policies and procedural rules that reflect the preferences of established powers. 
On this global multilateral level, India often finds itself standing alongside China and 
other members of the BRICS in demanding reforms. Indian policy makers have there-
fore welcomed the framing as a ‘rising power’ and bandwagoned with the BRICS as 
another route to global influence. But the regional level reveals a different picture. As 
China’s rise in Asia has unsettled the balances of power which have underpinned the 
region, India has maintained strong ties to Russia, pursued a strategic rapprochement 
with the United States, and sought to build stronger ties to countries in South East Asia 
and the wider Indo-Pacific region. In Asia, India has balanced China in an attempt to main-
tain its strategic autonomy in a manner consistent with its ‘non-aligned’ heritage. 
REFORMING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: 
BANDWAGONING WITH BRICS 
Since independence, Indians have typically felt that their country’s status in the 
world is inconsistent with their self-perception as a great civilization and an emerging 
great nation [Narlikar 2013; Nayar, Paul 2003]. Alongside functional gains from having 
influence over important international policy outcomes, seeking reform of global govern-
ance also serves the critical social purpose of gaining recognition and respect in world 
affairs [Nel 2010; Wolf 2011]. For this purpose, the BRICS club provides India with 
a coalition of similarly dissatisfied states with whom to cooperate in the reform of 
multilateral institutions. Reforming the institutions of global governance to give emerg-
ing and developing countries a greater say has been a core strategic objective of the 
BRICS club, as it is of India’s other informal diplomatic club, the IBSA Trilateral Forum 
[Stephen 2012; Nafey 2005; Armijo, Roberts 2014]. 
At the WTO, India has formed bargaining coalitions with other members of the 
BRICS. As a traditional critic of the dominance of Western countries in the multilateral 
trade regime, India has deftly exploited coalitions with other developing countries to 
receive integration in ‘green room’ negotiations of the major trade powers [Efstatho-
poulos 2012]. While characterized by strong dissimilarities in their trading profiles, 
India and the other BRICS states shared an aversion to the ‘deep integration’ agenda 
fostered by established powers [Stephen, Parizek 2015]. Brazil and India have been 
longstanding partners in the multilateral trading regime, whose cooperation goes back 
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at least to the GATT Uruguay Round, where they formed a core for developing coun-
tries sceptical of the new trade liberalization agenda [Hopewell 2014]. India has been 
restrained in its rhetoric about China’s trading practices and in 2011, BRICS Minis-
ters also made their first joint statement on the sidelines of a WTO Ministerial Con-
ference. 
Alongside the WTO, India has also worked together with China and the BRICS 
to attempt favourable reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). Already in 2009, the BRICs 
made reform of the IMF a central topic of their joint communiqués. Their financial com-
muniqué in 2009 called for “reviewing the IMF role and mandate so as to adapt it to 
a new global monetary and financial architecture”1. The specifics of their demands con-
sisted of the following: recapitalization of the IMF based on a permanent quota increase, 
an increase in the role of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), new credit facilities for 
crisis lending that would be more flexible regarding conditionality, a more balanced 
approach to macroeconomic surveillance that also focuses on developed countries’ 
policies and cross-border capital flows, and a major redistribution of voting rights and 
of representation on the Executive Board2. They also called for reform of the World 
Bank Group based on an even balance between advanced and emerging/developing 
countries, as well as heads of the IMF and World Bank to be selected “irrespective of 
nationality or regional considerations” 3. Opposition to the perceived liberal bias of the 
Bretton Woods institutions carried forward also into India’s, China’s, and other de-
veloping countries’ opposition to the World Bank annual Doing Business Report, in-
troduced in 2004, being seen as biased towards deregulation and outside the Bank’s 
remit4. Essentially, India and its BRICS partners seek to release these institutions away 
from Western control and into a multipolar constellation. 
This project has had limited success [Vestergaard, Wade 2015], and India along 
with the BRICS have sought autonomy from the IMF by accumulating unilateral re-
serves, and have furthered alternative sources of investment and credit provision through 
regional alternatives to the World Bank [Chin 2010]. In addition, at the behest of the 
Indian Finance Minister, the BRICS in 2012 commissioned a joint working group to 
study the viability of setting up a BRICS Development Bank, “for mobilizing resources 
for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging 
economies and developing countries, to supplement the existing efforts of multilateral 
and regional financial institutions for global growth and development”5. The intention 
to set up the BRICS New Development Bank was announced at the fifth BRICS Summit in 
                                                          
 1 BRIC Finance Ministers, “BRICs Finance Communiqué” (14 March 2009), §9. URL: 
www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090314-finance.html (accessed: 13.10.2016). 
 2 Ibid. 
 3 Ibid.  
 4 Bretton Woods Project, “India Complains Doing Business ‘not Robust’” (2013). URL: 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-572256 (accessed: 13.10.2016). 
 5 BRICS Leaders, “BRICS Leaders’ Declaration” (29 March 2012). URL: http://mea.gov.in/ 
mystart.php?id=190019162 (accessed: 13.10.2016). 
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Durban in 2013, with an initial capitalization of US $50 billion, and a mandate to focus 
on infrastructure development. Additionally, plans for a Contingent Reserve Arrange-
ment of US $100 billion were announced, to pool foreign exchange reserves among 
the BRICS countries6. By 2015 the New Development Bank had opened for business, 
creating another alternative to the IMF for crisis lending, and help to de-dollarize the 
financial relations amongst the BRICS countries [Sarkar 2016]. 
Meanwhile, India has supported the Russian and Chinese aspiration to revise the 
international monetary system by eroding the international dominance of the US dollar. 
The BRICS have called into question the legitimacy and efficiency of the US dollar’s 
role, calling for a more ‘diverse’ international monetary system, have begun invoicing 
intra-BRICS trade in their own currencies, and tried to boost the role of the IMF’s Special 
Drawing Rights7. A shift away from the dollar involves both a change in the international 
monetary system as well as a redistribution of the costs and benefits of controlling the 
world’s de facto currency. The potential erosion of the role of the US dollar has been 
interpreted as a major signal for the end of the Western-dominated global economic 
order [Helleiner, Kirshner 2009]. 
The major exception to this pattern is the Security Council and other regimes as-
sociated with unique privileges for the ‘P5’ countries, such as the Nuclear Non-prolife-
ration Treaty (NPT). India and Brazil are long-standing claimants to permanent seats on 
the Security Council, and South Africa’s deference to the African Union position has 
not hidden its aspirations also to be included. So far, however, any common interest 
that the BRICS countries might share in pushing the global system towards multipolarity 
has not been enough to overcome their divergent institutional interests on the Security 
Council, with BRICS declarations signaling only vague support for the IBSA states to 
play a greater role in the UN, but falling short of endorsing permanent Security Council 
membership. This stands in strong contrast to the positions of the Western P5 members, 
each of whom has in some way indicated support for Indian membership of the body 
[von Freiesleben 2013]. Here, India’s institutionally shaped interests clash with the 
broader interest in bandwagoning with China to reduce Western dominance. 
REGIONAL RIVALRIES: 
BALANCING A RISING CHINA 
With the notable exception of the UN Security Council and the NPT, India has 
found common cause with the BRICS countries in pushing for a thorough reform of 
multilateral institutions. While this has been only partly successful, it underlines the 
common dissatisfaction rising powers have with institutions typically created by formerly 
powerful countries who inscribe their advantages into institutional rules [Stephen 2017]. 
A different picture emerges on the regional level, however. 
6 Bretton Woods Project, “BRICS Challenge IFIs” (2013). URL: http://brettonwoodsproject.org/ 
art-572264 (accessed: 13.10.2016). 
7 BRICS Leaders, “BRICS Leaders’ Declaration” (14 April 2011). URL: http://netindian.in/ 
news/2011/04/14/00012494/sanya-declaration-brics-leaders (accessed: 13.10.2016). 
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A significant level of distrust and geo-strategic rivalry still characterizes Sino-In-
dian relations [Rehman 2009]. Signs of these geopolitical rivalries include accelerated 
increases of military spending in both countries, upgrades to frontier infrastructure with 
military ramifications, Chinese economic and military (including nuclear) ties to Paki-
stan, and the persistence of the border dispute [Rehman 2009]. Indian foreign policy 
thinkers have ranked China along with Pakistan as one of the two greatest ‘challenges’ 
that face Indian ‘hard power’, and have openly discussed the possibilities of a renewed 
Sino-Indian armed conflict [Khilnani et al. 2012: 38]. India has also looked on wearily 
as China has maintained ties to Pakistan, and boosted its ties to countries in India’s im-
mediate neighbourhood, such as Nepal, Bangladesh and the Maldives [Rehman 2009]. 
Although India does not want to be seen as part of an American anti-China contain-
ment or balancing strategy [Mehta 2009: 232], and has avoided being roped in to alli-
ances that would limit its strategic autonomy, its goal of independence and autonomy 
leads it to behaviour consistent with the balancing paradigm. 
Due to China’s economic first-mover advantage, its military preponderance, and 
its permanent Security Council seat, India has sought out ties to both Russia and the 
United States, and boosted its relations with smaller South East Asian nations as well 
as Japan and Indonesia [Blank 2007]. Strategic and military ties to Russia remain strong, 
and Narendra Modi reassured Vladimir Putin in 2015 that Russia remains India’s prin-
cipal external partner8. But probably the most significant response by India to China’s 
rise has been to move closer to the United States in the form of a ‘strategic partnership’. 
With the rise of China and broader signs of a Russian-Chinese partnership [Ying 2016], 
the United States has sought to overcome its estrangement from India and actively 
courts India as a major world power [Tellis 2005]. In 1998 the United States was 
condemning India for its Pokhran-II nuclear tests; by 2005 the two countries had con-
cluded the “US—India Civil Nuclear Agreement” (123 Agreement) under which India’s 
nuclear status was effectively recognized, despite India still refusing to sign the NPT 
or Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) [Narlikar 2013: 600]. Moreover, a common 
defense agreement and official statements welcoming and seeking to enhance India’s sta-
tus as a world power underlined the United States’ interest in courting India as a coun-
terweight to China [Blank 2007: 2—4; Rehman 2009: 125—29; Narlikar 2013: 599—
601]. This was enhanced again in 2010 with the US-India Strategic Dialogue. 
Nonetheless, India has also avoided entanglement in any US-led anti-China con-
tainment strategy. The nuclear deal with the United States was only narrowly passed 
in the Lok Sabha, and Russia has sought to deepen ties to India and China through the 
concept of a ‘strategic triangle’ [Blank 2007: 7—8]. Indian policy makers continue to 
attach a strong meaning to the concept of autonomy and independence in world affairs, 
the core concept behind its traditional stance of non-alignment [Khilnani et al. 2012; 
Nafey 2005]. Thus the strategic partnership with the United States is pursued at the same 
time as economic integration with China (China is India’s biggest trading partner) and 
                                                          
 8 TASS Russian News Agency, “Indian PM Narendra Modi: Russia Remains Our Principal Part-
ner” (22 December 2016). URL: http://tass.com/world/846052. 
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political engagement with other rising powers in the BRICS Forum. In this respect, 
the BRICS Forum undoubtedly benefits India in rebalancing its relations to Russia and 
China after its closer ties to the United States, as does India’s admission (along with 
Pakistan) to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, agreed in June 2016. 
*** 
The “balancing act” [Pant, Super 2015: 756] of India’s relations to the other major 
powers manifests differently in the global and regional levels. As India navigates con-
temporary international power shifts, it has sought out coalitions with the BRICS and 
other developing countries to push for reform of global governance. Yet China is per-
ceived as second only to Pakistan as one of India’s geopolitical threats, pushing it into 
closer ties to the United States, Japan, and the South East Asian countries. On the regional 
level, India has maintained ties to Russia and cultivated a strong relationship with the 
United States in an effort to balance and increase leverage relative to a rising China. This 
underlines that major power rivalries are strongly mediated by issue area and institu-
tional context. 
These two tracks of Indian foreign policy are not fully insulated but interrelated. 
International institutions continue to play an important role, but are increasingly affected 
by geopolitical tensions between the major powers. New institutions and groupings 
are emerging on a regional and interregional basis that in many ways would compete 
with universal multilateral institutions. Seen in this light, the BRICS initiative and the 
BRICS’ recent New Development Bank is only one case of a new politics of inter-
institutional competition. 
International politics has become more institutionally mediated and largely non-
ideological. No overarching cleavage characterizes political conflicts between the major 
powers, which vary according to institutional context and policy field. Yet, in light of 
events in Ukraine, Syria, the South China Sea, and across many multilateral contexts, 
a growing divergence has emerged between China and Russia, on one hand, and the 
United States and its Western partners, on the other. If these trends continue, India may 
face increased pressure — but also increased incentives — to side with one camp over 
the other. The choices that India currently faces may endure well into the future. 
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ИНДИЯ И БРИКС: 
«ГЛОБАЛЬНЫЙ КОНЦЕРТ» И РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫЙ БАЛАНС 
М.Д. Стивэн 
Берлинский научный центр социальных исследований, Берлин, Германия 
Индийские политики приветствовали восприятие Индии как «восходящей державы» и встре-
тили единым фронтом инициативу БРИКС по реформированию аспектов глобального управле-
ния. Тем не менее, подъем Китая в Азии не установил баланс сил в регионе, и, как следствие, 
Индия нерешительно следует по пути стратегического сближения с США. Оценивая много-
стороннюю и геостратегическую дипломатию Нью-Дели, автор статьи делает вывод о том, 
что Индия на глобальном уровне присоединяется к БРИКС, однако на региональном уровне 
стремится сбалансировать Китай. На глобальном многостороннем уровне у Индии есть ряд 
общих точек соприкосновения с другими восходящими державами в области реформирования 
политики и структуры большинства международных организаций. Исключением являются 
Совет Безопасности ООН и Договор о нераспространении ядерного оружия, где КНР и Россия 
рассматриваются как ведущие державы. Тем не менее, на региональном уровне Индия под-
держивает связи с Россией и культивирует прочные отношения с Соединенными Штатами 
Америки в попытке сбалансировать и увеличить рычаги влияния на возвышающийся Китай. 
Это подчеркивает, что проблемные области и институциональный контекст являются сильным 
связующим звеном для основных конкурирующих сил. 
Ключевые слова: балансирование, концерт, БРИКС, геополитика, глобальное управле-
ние, внешняя политика Индии, международные институты, восходящие державы, стратеги-
ческое партнерство. 
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